Spiritual Director Doesn't have a Prayer when it Comes to her Discrimination and Termination Claims

Religious employers can rejoice once again, as yet another court upholds the ministerial exception and dismisses an employee's discrimination and termination claims.

For those who are not familiar with this defense, the ministerial exception basically says that the government cannot step in and second-guess a religious entity's decision to hire and fire its ministerial employees. Doing so would potentially violate the First Amendment and would run afoul of the separation of church and state. This means that ministerial employees of religious employers cannot sue for things like discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or termination, because that would be asking the court, in essence, to decide whether the religious employer was right in doing what it did.

As you might imagine, the inquiry into whether this exception applies can get a bit murky. Two of the biggest issues that typically come up in such cases is whether the entity is really a "religious" institution, and whether the employee is really a "ministerial" employee. In this case, the Court found that the entity was a religious organization and the employee was a "ministerial" employee., and thus, the decision to terminate could not be challenged and the employee's claims were dismissed.

Background Facts and History

Alyce Conlon was a spiritual director who provided religious counsel and prayer services at InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA (IVCF). IVCF's mission involves serving students and faculty at colleges and universities regarding God, God's word, and God's purposes in the world, among other things. Interestingly enough, and probably not a common policy in most secular employee handbooks, IVCF had a policy that "encourages" employees to seek assistance at resolving any "significant marital issues."

As it turns out, this policy applied to Conlon, as she and her husband were having marital issues. She advised her supervisors that she was contemplating divorce, at which time, she was placed on paid (and then later unpaid) leave. During this time, she was specifically supposed to attempt to repair her marriage, pursuant to IVCF policy. Her supervisors were actively involved in this process. After some time off, Conlon asked repeatedly to be permitted to return to work but her supervisors would not allow her. In fact, she was eventually placed on unpaid leave because one of the supervisors claimed she was not being truthful and that she was not making good enough efforts to reconcile her marriage. She ended up getting fired for failing to reconcile her marriage. It was only after she was terminated that she actually filed for divorce.

Conlon filed a complaint with the EEOC and the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, and later filed suit claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and corresponding state statutes for gender discrimination. She claimed that similarly situated male employees had gotten divorces during their employment and were not terminated.

IVCF filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the ministerial exception allows them to make these types of decisions in that the First Amendment and the freedom of religious organization precludes the application of Title VII and related laws to claims relating to the employment relationship between religious organizations and their ministers. The district court granted the motion and Conlon appealed.

Court of Appeals Affirms Dismissal

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, telling Conlon she could not maintain these claims against IVCF. The Court held that the ministerial exception bars all of Conlon's claims, even the state court claims and those against the supervisors individually. The Court found that while IVCF is not a church, it is a religious affiliated entity whose "mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics." Further, the Court found that the ministerial exception protects against the claim at issue because though Conlon was not a "minister," she worked as a spiritual director, which conveys a religious (as opposed to secular) meaning. Her job duties entailed assisting others to cultivate "intimacy with God and growth in Christ-like character through personal and corporate spiritual disciplines," which the Court found to be a ministerial function.

Even despite the foregoing findings, in an effort to save her claims, Conlon argued that the ministerial exception should not apply because IVCF waived the exception, but the Court quickly dismissed this argument on the grounds that the exception is a structural limitation imposed on the government by the Religion Clauses and can never be waived.

The Court made two additional rulings: 1) that the First Amendment's ministerial exception could be asserted as a defense against state law claims, as the exception is recognized under Michigan state law, and the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses apply to states through the Fourteenth Amendment; and 2) that the individual defendants could claim the ministerial exception when personally sued for discrimination as agents of the religious employer.

The Take Away

This is yet another case in which the courts have declined to cross the line between church and state and have refused to substitute their judgment for a religious organization's.

The defenses addressed, in this case, do not apply to secular employers, but religious employers out there should take note. If the entity sufficiently espouses a religious mission, and it has employees who are ministers or perform minister-like job duties, those employers may be able to successfully defeat claims similar to those filed by Conlon. This is a good reminder for religious employers to review their mission statement and employee policies and procedures. This includes job descriptions. Do the documents convey a religious purpose? Is the employee expected to perform religious functions? Aside from what the documents say, what is the true purpose of the organization and what is the expectation of the employee? A religious employer certainly does not want to unintentionally preclude what could otherwise be a successful defense by virtue of a lack of this simple yet critical information.

Employers with questions about this case or about the ministerial defense at issue can contact their Hinshaw employment attorney.