Female Manager may Proceed with pay Disparity-Gender Discrimination Claim

March 15, 2012 by Linda K. Horras

The concept of equal pay for equal work seems simple to understand and apply. If Jan and Joe have similar education, skills, and experience, and perform similar work, it is reasonable to assume that their pay is also the same. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, even though the Equal Pay Act has been on the books for nearly 50 years. The Seventh Circuit recently dealt with this issue in King v. Acosta Sales & Marketing, Inc.. (11-3617, Mar. 13, 2012). Plaintiff, a sales manager, performed the same duties and responsibilities as her male peers and was highly successful—in fact, more successful than many of them, yet, her salary, both when she started and when she ended her job, was substantially lower than that of her male co-workers. The numbers were shocking disproportional, with the highest paid male sales managers often earning two to three times more than she made. More ›

Supreme Court Rejects Massive Class Action Against Wal-Mart

July 11, 2011 by Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP

In a highly anticipated ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court recently issued its opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al. (S. Ct. June 20, 2011). Plaintiffs claimed that the discretion afforded to local store managers over pay and promotions had an unfair, discriminatory impact on female employees. The proposed class in the case covered approximately 1.5 million current and former Wal-Mart employees, and would have involved billions of dollars in potential damages. The Court’s opinion hinged on the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, which regulates class actions. Among other things, Rule 23 requires that the claims of all potential class members share a common issue of law or fact. Here, that would require evidence that women were the victim of one common discriminatory practice. With respect to this issue, the Court recognized that sufficient commonality might be established where an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination through which discrimination occurred via entirely subjective decision-making processes, it made clear that such a showing must rest on “substantial proof.” Moreover, the Court recognized that allowing such discretion is a common, presumptively reasonable business practice that raises no inference of discriminatory conduct. More ›

Search

Subscribe via Email

RSSSubscribe via RSS
TwitterFollow us on Twitter

Blog Editors

Blog Contributors

Archives